Δημοσιεύσεις

@conference{Vrachimis2018,
title = {LeakDB: A benchmark dataset for leakage diagnosis in water distribution networks},
author = {Stelios G. Vrachimis and Marios S. Kyriakou and Demetrios G. Eliades and Marios M. Polycarpou},
url = {https://zenodo.org/record/1313116#.W5rCrvZ9i00},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-08-22},
booktitle = {Proc. of WDSA/CCWI},
address = {Ontario, Canada},
abstract = {The increase of streaming data from water utilities is enabling the development of real-time anomaly
and fault detection algorithms that can detect events, such as pipe bursts and leakages. Currently,
there is not a widely accessible dataset of real or realistic leakage scenarios, which could be used as
a common benchmark to compare different algorithms, as well as to support research reproducibility.
In this work we propose the design of a realistic leakage dataset, the Leakage Diagnosis Benchmark
(LeakDB). The dataset is comprised of a large number of artificially created but realistic leakage
scenarios, on different water distribution networks, under varying conditions. Additionally, a scoring
algorithm was developed in MATLAB to evaluate the results of different algorithms using various
metrics. The usage of the LeakDB dataset, is demonstrated by scoring four detection algorithms. The
dataset is stored on an open research data repository, and will be updated in the future with new
simulation scenarios. The source code of the toolkit that generates the leakage benchmark dataset,
as well as the detection algorithms used, are released as open source},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {conference}
}

@conference{Nicolaou2018b,
title = {Reducing Vulnerability to Cyber-physical Attacks in Water Distribution Networks},
author = {Nicolas Nicolaou and Demetrios G. Eliades and Christos Panayiotou and Marios M. Polycarpou},
url = {https://zenodo.org/record/1250406#.W5rBGvZ9i00},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1109/CySWater.2018.00011},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-03-16},
booktitle = {Proc. International Workshop on Cyber-physical Systems for Smart Water Networks (CySWater)},
journal = {Transactions of Secure Systems},
pages = {16--19},
address = {Porto, Portugal},
abstract = {Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), such as Water Distribution Networks (WDNs), deploy digital devices to monitor and control the behavior of physical processes. These digital devices, however, are susceptible to cyber and physical attacks, that may alter their functionality, and therefore the integrity of their measurements/actions. In practice, industrial control systems utilize simple control laws, which rely on various sensor measurements and algorithms which are expected to operate normally. To reduce the impact of a potential failure, operators may deploy redundant components; this however may not be useful, e.g., when a cyber attack at a PLC component occurs. In this work, we address the problem of reducing vulnerability to cyber-physical attacks in water distribution networks. This is achieved by augmenting the graph which describes the information flow from sensors to actuators, by adding new connections and algorithms, to increase the number of redundant cyber components. These, in turn, increase the cyber-physical security level, which is defined in the present paper as the number of malicious attacks a CPS may sustain before becoming unable to satisfy the control requirements. A proof-of-concept of the approach is demonstrated over a simple WDN, with intuition on how this can be used to increase the cyber-physical security level of the system.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {conference}
}